People rate AI as more moral than other humans
“Our findings lead us to believe that a computer could technically pass a moral Turing test—that it could fool us in its moral reasoning.”
“Our findings lead us to believe that a computer could technically pass a moral Turing test—that it could fool us in its moral reasoning.”
“Our findings lead us to believe that a computer could technically pass a moral Turing test—that it could fool us in its moral reasoning.”
The COVID-19 pandemic altered a long-held convention that doctors provide care regardless of personal risk.
By David Hricik, Mercer Law School
Over on Gene Quinn’s IPwatchdog page, former chief judge Rader has written an article about the Supreme Court’s 101 jurisprudence. I clerked for then chief-judge Rader in 2012-13 (I think I have been the clerk’s oldest clerk, then 51 years old). Alice was issued by the Federal Circuit during my tenure and of course I can’t talk about what I saw, but I can say that the article aligns with my own thoughts about 101: Congress in 1946 (and then 1952) did its level best to get rid of “eligibility” as condition of patentability. The fact that Section 101 is not a “condition of patentability” lends great support to that, as does the legislative history of the 1946 and 1952 act.
I blogged about the textual arguments 11 years ago (sigh) and you can find those comments here.
Tilting at wind mills but maybe this strongly textualist court will realize it has run astray from the text… And maybe I’ll win the Powerball…
Continue reading Rader on 101 and the Statutory Text at Patently-O.
By David Hricik, Mercer Law School
I realize most readers aren’t law professors, so you can stop now…
I have taught IP courses for years and often the books seek to teach the subject through cases, which is a very difficult way to learn it. This book — Patent Law: Fundamentals of Doctrine and Policy (Carolina Academic Press) — does a great job of using cases to illustrate key points, but often provides descriptive text and problems, and does so in a practical and concise way, and a way geared toward current learning trends.
I’ll be brief, but with respect to its organization, the authors use the funnel approach for many subjects, starting broad (a patent gives a negative right to exclude) and then narrowing (the right to exclude is measured by the claims). It also uses spaced repetition (those two subjects are chapters apart but mentioned in both places), and includes self-assessment questions after each chapter.
More importantly to me, it is efficient. Again, most of it is text, not case excerpts, and it teaches using simple technology (baking pants — I use pizza to explain patents because it’s easy to draft claims to describe pizza and to understand that the fewer words/limitations the “broader” the patent but this works too).
Because tech industry ethics teams lack resources and authority, their effectiveness is spotty at best, according to a new study.
By David Hricik, Mercer Law School
In a single decision issued by several panels, the Board held that the patentee had failed to act in good faith by, boiled down, intentionally withholding material test data that was inconsistent with the arguments it was making in favor of patentability of both original and proposed substitute claims. The case is Spectrum Solutions LLC v. Longhorn Vaccines & Diagnostics LLC, IPR2021-00847 (Patent 8,084,443 B2), IPR2021-00850 (Patent 8,293,467 B2), IPR2021-00854 (Patent 8,669,240 B2), IPR2021-00857 (Patent 9,212,399 B2), IPR2021-00860 (Patent 9,683,256 B2) (May 3, 2023).
Basically, the claims were directed to a composition that would kill certain pathogens and the test data showed it didn’t. If so, then of course the Board’s conclusion that intentionally withholding that information violates the duty of candor is itself no news.
What is worth discussing is the Board’s statement that Rule 56 applied to an IPR. It cited and quoted Rule 56 in several spots, though it also cited and quoted the IPR rules in other spots.
Why does this matter? Citing Rule 56 is wrong. By its terms it applies only to “the filing and prosecution of a patent application…” IPRs are not “patent prosecution.” (Nor are ex parte re-examinations, which are subject to a different rule from both Rule 56 and the IPR rules, but I digress.).
by David Hricik, Mercer Law School
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires that fraud or mistake be pled with particularity. The Federal Circuit has held that, although inequitable conduct is “broader than fraud” inequitable conduct must be pled with particularity in Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2009). (A digression: I think this is wrong because the Supreme Court has held that Rule 9(b) is limited to “fraud” and “mistake” and it is improper to rely on judicial policies to expand the plain meaning of the rule. See David Hricik, Wrong about Everything: The Application by the District Courts of Rule 9(b) to Inequitable Conduct, 86 Marquette Law Review 895 (2003) (here).)
One issue that has split the district courts is whether the “single most reasonable inference” standard for scienter applies at the pleading stage. The court in Deere & Co v. Kinze Mfg., Inc (No. 4:20-cv-00389-RGE-HC, C.D. Iowa May 1, 2023) collected the cases:
iLife Techs. Inc. v. AliphCom, No. 14-CV-03345-WHO, 2015 WL 890347, at *4 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2015) (“I recognize that there is currently a dispute among courts as to the pleading requirements for an inequitable conduct counterclaim.”) (collecting cases); see also Wyeth Holdings Corp.
Continue reading The Split on Pleading Scienter for Inequitable Conduct at Patently-O.
by David Hricik, Mercer Law School
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires that fraud or mistake be pled with particularity. The Federal Circuit has held that, although inequitable conduct is “broader than fraud” inequitable conduct must be pled with particularity in Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2009). (A digression: I think this is wrong because the Supreme Court has held that Rule 9(b) is limited to “fraud” and “mistake” and it is improper to rely on judicial policies to expand the plain meaning of the rule. See David Hricik, Wrong about Everything: The Application by the District Courts of Rule 9(b) to Inequitable Conduct, 86 Marquette Law Review 895 (2003) (here).)
One issue that has split the district courts is whether the “single most reasonable inference” standard for scienter applies at the pleading stage. The court in Deere & Co v. Kinze Mfg., Inc (No. 4:20-cv-00389-RGE-HC, C.D. Iowa May 1, 2023) collected the cases:
iLife Techs. Inc. v. AliphCom, No. 14-CV-03345-WHO, 2015 WL 890347, at *4 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2015) (“I recognize that there is currently a dispute among courts as to the pleading requirements for an inequitable conduct counterclaim.”) (collecting cases); see also Wyeth Holdings Corp.
Continue reading The Split on Pleading Scienter for Inequitable Conduct at Patently-O.
As brain-computer interface technologies become more common, so do questions related to ethics and policy. A new book digs in.